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This article estimates marginal propensities to consume (MPC) out of current and lagged
income for U.S. states using panel data regressions that control for time-speciﬁc and state-
level ﬁxed eﬀects. The MPCs vary across states, in particular, the MPC out of current income
is higher in states where income is more persistent and the MPC out of lagged income is
lower in agricultural states. Several models of individual consumer behavior are analyzed
and simulated in order to isolate a model which is able to match the estimated MPCs well.
KEYWORDS: Permanent Income, Credit rationing, Precautionary saving, Time-Aggregation,
Durable Goods, Risk Sharing.
JEL classifications: E21 - Consumption; Saving.1 Introduction
We estimate marginal propensities to consume (MPC) out of current and lagged income for U.S.
states using panel data regressions that control for time-speciﬁc and state-level ﬁxed eﬀects. The
MPCs vary across states, in particular, the MPC out of current income is higher in states where
income is more persistent and the MPC out of lagged income is lower in agricultural states. We
then analyze and simulate models of individual consumer behavior and isolate a model which is
able to match the estimated MPCs well.
Virtually all current models of aggregate consumer behavior depart from the Friedman
(1957)-Hall (1978) Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH). Hall (1978) showed that if consumers
are forward-looking, have rational expectations, evaluate consumption streams utilizing a quadratic
utility function, and can freely borrow and lend at a constant interest rate, consumption is a
martingale; i.e., a regression of period t consumption growth on any variable known at period
t − 1 should return an estimate of zero. Regressions using aggregate data, however, consis-
tently return an estimate signiﬁcantly larger than zero when current growth in consumption
is regressed on lagged aggregate income growth—a phenomenon known as “excess sensitivity”
(of current consumption to lagged income). The PIH-model also provides closed-form solutions
for the predicted growth in consumption as a function of innovations to income when income
is described by a general Auto Regressive-Moving Average (ARMA) model. For example, if
income is a random walk, consumption is predicted to move one-to-one with income. Empirical
work using aggregate data consistently ﬁnds a signiﬁcantly smaller reaction of consumption to
income shocks—a phenomenon known as “excess smoothness.”1
State-level data has several advantages for our study. Compared with purely macro ap-
proaches, the existence of 50 states with diﬀerent income processes (some agricultural, some
oil-based, etc.) vastly expands the relevant variation and the number of data points. In addi-
tion, by considering state-level variation that is orthogonal to aggregate variation, simultaneity
problems are likely to be alleviated and U.S.-wide aggregate constraints will have little impact
on the results as argued by Ostergaard, Sørensen, and Yosha (2002) and Dejuan and Luengo-
1For studies of excess sensitivity, see Flavin (1981), Blinder and Deaton (1985), Campbell and Deaton (1989),
and Attanasio and Weber (1993). Building on the results in Hansen and Sargent (1981), excess smoothness has
been documented by Deaton (1987), Campbell and Deaton (1989), and Gal´ ı (1991).
1Prado (2006).2 The persistence of state-level income aﬀects the current MPC signiﬁcantly—with
states with higher persistence exhibiting higher MPCs—consistent with a standard PIH model.
However, state-level consumption displays strong excess smoothness and sensitivity. Further,
we observe that excess sensitivity is higher in states where consumers are likely to face higher
income uncertainty. These facts imply that the PIH-model needs to be extended. We will do so
in stages in order to highlight the eﬀect of each modiﬁcation.
A simple and, we think, reasonable, explanation of excess sensitivity is that consumption
decisions are made at a higher frequency than the frequency of observation (annual).3 We allow
for a bi-annual frequency of income and consumption in the model and explicitly aggregate over
time. This helps explain the average level of excess sensitivity. However, excess sensitivity of
consumption is signiﬁcantly higher in agricultural states which needs a separate explanation.
Based on the observation that farmers’ income is particularly volatile as shown by Carroll and
Samwick (1997), we show that the so-called buﬀer-stock model of savings, pioneered by Deaton
(1991) and Carroll (1992), can explain this pattern. This is a model of individual-level behavior
that does not allow for a representative agent and we simulate the model for a large number
of individuals, aggregate, and ﬁnd the predicted MPCs by regressing on the simulated data.
This approach, therefore, also controls for potential biases that may arise from considering a
representative agent instead of aggregating across agents (see Attanasio and Weber 1993).
However, the buﬀer-stock model cannot fully explain the amount of excess smoothness as
already pointed out by Ludvigson and Michaelides (2001). Including durable consumption—in
the form of large indivisible durable goods that can only be purchased with a non-negligible down
payment—generates signiﬁcant smoothness as found by Luengo-Prado (2006). Nonetheless,
the MPC out of current income is lower than the model with durable goods can explain with
2The state-level data is not plagued by the large amount of idiosyncratic variation in micro data and it is hard
to know what patterns in micro-data is likely to survive aggregation. Compared to cross-country data, the data
is collected in a consistent manner and most institutional features do not vary across states, making our results
less likely to suﬀer from omitted variable bias. One drawback of our state-level data, compared to macroeconomic
data, is that we only observe retail sales and not all components of consumption; however, no U.S. sources of
micro data is better along this dimension. For example, the much used Panel Study of Income Dynamics mainly
records food consumption rather than the total retail sales available at the state-level. In any event, studies based
on state-level data provide a useful complement to other studies.
3An alternative modiﬁcation that might explain excess sensitivity would be to allow for habit formation. We
brieﬂy explored this issue but did not ﬁnd much evidence of habit formation in our data using common parametric
speciﬁcations as used by, for instance, Dynan (2000).
2“reasonable” parameterizations. To fully match the observed smoothness of consumption, we
follow Attanasio and Pavoni (2006) and assume that measured income shocks are imperfect
measures of shocks to consumers’ inter-temporal budgets.4 The models discussed so far assume
that a consumer’s budget constraint is determined by labor income and interest from safe bond
holdings. In the real world, asset income comes in many forms that often are not measured well,
in particular, capital gains have been large and variable during the sample we consider. Also,
individuals share risk with family members and through various ethnic, religious, etc. networks.
Therefore, labor income may be an imperfect measure of innovations to a consumer’s present
value of wealth, and a model that allows for partial risk sharing across states can explain the
low observed MPCs. Adding a simple form of partial risk sharing to the buﬀer-stock model
with durable goods and time-aggregation allows us to match the observed MPCs in a way that
simpler models cannot.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical results.
Section 3 compares the ability of suitable parameterized models of consumer behavior to explain
the results found in Section 2, while Section 4 summarizes our conclusions.
2 Panel Data Estimation of the Income Process and the MPCs
2.1 Estimating the time series process for income
In forward-looking models, consumption patterns depend on the income processes so we start
by estimating time series models for income state-by-state for the years 1964–1998. Ostergaard,
Sørensen, and Yosha (2002) show that disposable labor income growth at the state-level is well-
modeled as an autoregressive (AR) model of order 1.5 A previous version of this paper, that
focused on the buﬀer-stock model and uncertainty, allowed for a more complicated process for
state-level income. Speciﬁcally, an additive i.i.d. income shock was allowed for beyond the AR-
term. However, for most states this transitory aggregate shock was not signiﬁcant and only for
4In the case of perfect Arrow-Debreu markets, consumption should not react to individual speciﬁc labor income
shocks. However, an outcome where there is not perfect risk sharing (in the sense that labor income risk is not fully
insured) can be a constrained optimal outcome if income depends on unobserved eﬀort as rigorously developed
by Attanasio and Pavoni (2006).
5We tested the level of disposable labor income for unit roots using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with one
lag and could only reject the unit root for 6 and 1 states at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Therefore, the
growth rate of income is reasonably well modeled as a stationary variable.
3a few states did we ﬁnd the parameter of the transitory shock to be precisely estimated. We,
therefore, ﬁnd it preferable to use the simpler, more common, AR(1) speciﬁcation. We elaborate
on this point because the predicted impact on consumption of the uncertainty (variance) of
state-level income depends on whether income shocks are transitory but our sample is too
short to convincingly decompose the state-level income processes into permanent and transitory
components.
Deﬁne the state-speciﬁc component of growth in disposable labor income as logGst =
∆logYst −∆logYt. In the data, mean growth rates vary by state but in our theoretical discus-
sion we do not explore the eﬀects of state-varying growth rates. We make this choice because
in-migration in some states, such as Nevada, is so large that mean growth rates over 20-odd
years cannot easily be interpreted as reﬂecting the income growth prospects of individuals. In
the estimation of state-speciﬁc processes, we demean the data prior to estimation, and estimate
for each state s the process:
logGst = as logGs,t−1 + σGs ust,
where ust is i.i.d. standard normal and σ2
Gs is the variance of the innovation term, σGs ust.W e
refer to as as a measure of persistence—the larger as the larger eﬀect an innovation of a given
size will have on expected future income.
In Table 1, we report the estimated values of as and σGs for each of the 50 U.S. states–data
sources are described in Appendix A. The persistence of state-speciﬁc shocks varies widely
across states. The point estimate of as is –0.53 for Idaho while the largest value of 0.50 is
found for Louisiana, with an average value of 0.07. If the aggregate eﬀect is not removed
average persistence is signiﬁcantly higher at 0.38 which reﬂects that the aggregate component
of income growth displays more persistence than the state-speciﬁc component. This diﬀerence
in persistence implies that forward-looking consumers will react more to aggregate than to
state-speciﬁc shocks in most states. Estimating an AR(1) process for aggregate income growth,
∆logYt = At, we obtain estimates of µA =0 .016,a A =0 .42 and σA =0 .02.
42.2 Panel-data estimation of the MPCs
2.2.1 Econometric Implementation
Let cst ≡ ∆logCst denote the growth rate of state-level consumption. In our implementation,
we regress cst on income growth, yst, and lagged income growth, ys,t−1, respectively. Aggregate
policy and aggregate interest rates aﬀect consumption. It is not obvious how to best capture
such aggregate eﬀects using exogenous regressors, so we follow Ostergaard, Sørensen, and Yosha
(2002) and perform all regressions in terms of the deviations from the average value across states
in each time period.6 In symbols, we regress cst −¯ c.t on yst − ¯ y.t and ys,t−1 − ¯ y.,t−1, respectively,
where ¯ c.t = 1
50
50
s=1 cst is the time-speciﬁc mean of consumption growth and similarly for the
other variables. Removing time-speciﬁc means is equivalent to including a dummy variable for
each time period. Such time-speciﬁc dummy variables are referred to as time-ﬁxed eﬀects in the
panel-data literature, and including time-ﬁxed eﬀects implies that we are measuring the eﬀect of
state-speciﬁc changes in income on state-speciﬁc consumption. We also want our results to be
robust to permanent diﬀerences between the states. For instance, some states may have higher
consumption growth due to demographic factors that are hard to control for. We, therefore,
also remove state-speciﬁc averages; i.e., we use data in the form (for a generic variable x):
zst = xst − ¯ x.t − ¯ xs. +¯ x.., where ¯ xs. = 1
T
T
t=1 xst is the state-speciﬁc mean of x and the last
term is the overall average across states and time; this is added to keep the mean of zst equal
to 0. Using variables in this form is equivalent to including state-speciﬁc (and, as before, time-
speciﬁc) dummy variables. In the language of panel-data econometrics, we include a state-ﬁxed
eﬀect (also referred to as a “cross-sectional ﬁxed eﬀect”). We will use the shorter panel-data
econometric notation and write our regressions as:
cst = µs + νt + αc yst + ust , (1)
where the µs terms symbolize the inclusion of cross-sectional ﬁxed eﬀects and the νt terms
symbolize the inclusion of time-ﬁxed eﬀects. In the above regressions, αc is measuring the
current MPC. If X is a variable that might aﬀect the MPC, we allow the MPC to change with
6Empirically, it matters little if the data is adjusted by subtracting average values of the state-level variables
or if U.S.-wide aggregate values are subtracted. The method chosen here is the most straightforward in terms of
implementation.
5X by estimating the regression:
cst = µs + νt + αc
st yst + ust, (2)
where αc
st = αc + ζc (Xst − ¯ X.t).
In this regression, the current MPC is αc + ζc (Xst − ¯ X.t) where the time-speciﬁc average
of Xst is subtracted in order to remove U.S.-wide aggregate eﬀects.7 We subtract the time-
speciﬁc average ¯ X.t from the X variable so the ζ-coeﬃcient will not pick up variations in the
average (across states) MPC over time. We do not subtract the state-speciﬁc average from the
X variable. The goal is to study if the MPC varies across states and, indeed, many of the “X-
variables” we utilize are constant over time and would become trivially zero if the state-speciﬁc
averages were subtracted.
In our implementation, we will often include more than one interaction variable and each of
them will be treated as explained above. Our regressions using lagged income are done in the
exact same fashion, substituting yt−1 for yt everywhere.
We use the sample period 1970–1998 for which our data is available.8 We approximate
state-level consumption by state-level retail sales. We transform retail sales and labor income
to per capita terms and deﬂate them using the Consumer Price Index. Details are given in
Appendix A.
2.3 Regressors
We turn to the empirical estimation of the MPCs as functions of state-level variables. As
interaction terms, we use variables that capture state-level persistence of income shocks and
indicators of uncertainty.
Persistence of aggregate shocks. Our measure of the persistence of aggregate shocks in state
s is the estimated parameter ˆ as shown in Table 1, column (1).
7In order to estimate this model, we regress cst on yst,( Xst − ¯ X.t)(yst − ¯ y.t − ¯ ys. +¯ y..), and time- and
state-speciﬁc dummy variables.
8A previous version used a sample period starting in 1976. The results are not very sensitive to the exact
sample.
6Aggregate state-level uncertainty. The estimated standard error of the innovation to aggre-
gate income ˆ σGs, Table 1, column (2).
Individual-level income volatility. We use the share of farmers in a state. Farmers are subject
to substantially higher transitory income uncertainty than other income groups as documented
in table 4 in Carroll and Samwick (1997). Based on this result, we examine if the lagged
MPC is lower in states where a relatively large number of consumers can be expected to have
high variance of transitory idiosyncratic income. In our implementation, we use the interaction
variable “farm share” (number of employed—including proprietors—in farming divided by total
employment in the state).
Government sector jobs are less subject to the vagaries of nature and to the state-level
business cycle implying that the share of government employees may be a good proxy for states
with a low value of individual-level transitory uncertainty—see table 4 in Carroll and Samwick
(1997).
Correlation matrix for regressors. Table 2 presents the correlations of our regressors in the
estimations of current and lagged MPCs: the share of farmers in total employment, the share
of government employment and the interactions of these employment shares, and estimated
persistence and standard deviations of the income shocks interacted with income growth (non-
interacted persistence and standard deviations are not included as regressors as they would
be perfectly collinear with the state-ﬁxed eﬀects). The diﬀerences between the top and the
bottom part of the table are mainly in the correlations between the regressors with current
versus lagged income growth. The agriculture share “interaction” is strongly correlated with
the persistence interaction as well as with the parameter for aggregate uncertainty interacted
with income growth, which may render the interpretation of the variable uncertain, but the
share of government interaction is not highly correlated with other regressors.
2.4 Empirical results of the panel-data estimations
We estimate the model allowing for state- and time-speciﬁc variances. More precisely, we esti-
mate the model by feasible Generalized Least Squares (GLS) by ﬁrst estimating the model using
ordinary least squares (OLS) and then estimating a time-speciﬁc variance and state-speciﬁc vari-
7ance for use in the second stage GLS regression. In speciﬁcations that involve the state-level
persistence and uncertainty parameters, the standard errors will be biased because these pa-
rameters are measured with error (they are “generated regressors”). We calculate adjusted
standard errors using a Monte Carlo method described in Appendix D.
Current MPC. Columns (1) and (4) of Table 3 show speciﬁcations where non-interacted
farm and government shares are included. The non-interacted terms are not signiﬁcant and
subsequently dropped. These regressions simply document that the coeﬃcients to the interaction
terms do not simply pick up left-out “linear terms.” Column (2) reports the MPC out of current
income from a regression of consumption growth on current income growth and current income
growth interacted with the four variables that we suspect may aﬀect the MPC. In column (3), we
show the results leaving out regressors that are clearly insigniﬁcant. Because all the interaction
variables have the time-speciﬁc mean subtracted, the coeﬃcient to current income growth is
the predicted value for a typical state—i.e., a state with average persistence, agricultural share,
etc. We ﬁnd that the MPC out of current income for a typical state is 0.33 (or 0.34 from
the column (2) speciﬁcation). This is clearly lower than the prediction of a PIH model with
persistent income shocks such as was found for state-level income. This is, of course, the well-
known “excess smoothness” result that we will focus on explaining in Section 3.
The eﬀect of persistence is estimated robustly and clearly signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The
estimated value of the coeﬃcient to persistence of state-speciﬁc income is 0.53 from column (23)
and even larger from column (2). This corresponds to a large economic impact. For example,
the MPC in Iowa (with persistence –0.38) is predicted to be about 0.10 while the MPC in
Washington (with persistence 0.40) is predicted to be 0.51.9 The eﬀect of persistence is estimated
to be slightly larger when other interaction terms are included. The state-speciﬁc variance of
the innovation to state-level income is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. We suspect that state-level
uncertainty may inﬂuence consumption patterns but we are not able to identify this with any
certainty.
Lagged MPC. Table 3 also examines the same speciﬁcation in terms of the MPC out of
lagged income (“excess sensitivity”). For the average state, the MPC is estimated to be 0.16
9The number for, e.g., Iowa, is obtained as 0.33+0.53×(−0.38−0.07), where the term −0.07 corresponds to
the subtraction of the average value.
8in column (5) which includes all interactions. The eﬀect of lagged income growth is robustly
estimated—the coeﬃcient is 0.17 in column (6), which includes only the signiﬁcant regressors,
and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Clearly, consumption displays excess sensitivity in our data. The
interaction terms involving parameters of the estimated income process are clearly insigniﬁcant.
This is somewhat encouraging because PIH-type models predict that persistence aﬀects the
current MPC and not the lagged MPC and the fact that the data so clearly displays this pattern
indicates that our results are not likely to be spurious. We ﬁnd a clear eﬀect of the agricultural
share, with more agricultural states displaying much lower sensitivity to lagged income shocks.
We believe that this is due to a higher level of income uncertainty in agricultural states, a
belief that is reinforced by the fact that states with large government employment display the
opposite pattern. The interaction terms for both these variables have extremely large levels
of statistical signiﬁcance.10 We next turn to more rigorously evaluating if a combination of
standard consumption models can explain these patterns.
3 Alternative Consumption Models
Our analysis will show that a combination of models is indeed required to account for the state-
level MPCs that we just presented. In particular, we need forward-looking rational consumers,
liquidity constraints and indivisible durables, buﬀer-stock saving, and risk sharing.
This section brieﬂy presents the diﬀerent models we consider. We compare a PIH model,
a standard buﬀer-stock model, an augmented buﬀer-stock with durables and collateral credit
constraints, and a simple model with rule-of-thumb consumers (i.e., agents who consume their
income every period). We also discuss time-aggregation and risk sharing. Before focusing
on the predictions of each model, in Table 5, we present the income process common to all
models. Then, we brieﬂy discuss how the models diﬀer, as well as our calibration and aggregation
procedures.
10Large coeﬃcients of opposite sign are sometimes an indicator of multi-collinearity so we remind the reader
that the government and agricultural employee shares are not strongly correlated. Also, if we drop one of these
regressors the coeﬃcients of the remaining regressors change by little.
93.1 The income process
In all models considered, disposable labor income is assumed to be exogenous to the agent,
stochastic, and the only source of uncertainty. We assume the income of agent j in state s
follows the model:
Yjt = PjtVjt,
Pjt = Pjt−1 At Gst Njt. (3)
Labor income, Yjt, is the product of permanent income, Pjt and an idiosyncratic transitory shock,
Vjt. At can be thought of as growth of permanent income attributable to aggregate productivity
growth in the country, while Gst reﬂects growth of permanent income speciﬁc to state s. Njt is
a permanent idiosyncratic shock. logNjt and logVjt are independent and identically normally
distributed with variances σ2
N and σ2
V , and means −σ2
N/2a n d−σ2
V /2, respectively. logAt is
assumed to be an AR(1) process with persistence aA, unconditional mean µA, and variance σ2
A.
logGst is also an AR(1) process with persistence as, mean 0, and variance σ2
Gs.
This income speciﬁcation is useful since it allows for consumers to share in aggregate and
state-speciﬁc growth while the variance of their income can be calibrated to be dominated by
idiosyncratic permanent or transitory components. The formulation implies that the growth rate
of individual labor income follows an ARMA process, ∆logYjt =l o g At +l o gGst +l o gNjt +
logVjt − logVjt−1, consistent with microeconomic evidence (e.g., MaCurdy 1982, Abowd and
Card 1989). By the law of large numbers, aggregate income growth can be written as ∆logYt =
logAt, while state-speciﬁc income growth is ∆logYst − ∆logYt =l o gGst.
3.2 The models
The Permanent Income Hypothesis
The PIH assumes forward-looking rational consumers. The basic set up is as follows. Con-
sumer j maximizes the present discounted value of expected utility from consumption of a
nondurable good, C.L e tβ ≤ 1 be the discount factor and R the interest factor (gross interest
rate). Sjt is agent j’s holding of a riskless ﬁnancial asset at the end of period t. Each period,
10the funds available to agent j consist of the gross return on assets RSjt−1 plus Yjt units of labor









s.t. Sjt = RSjt−1 + Yjt − Cjt. (4)
The utility function is assumed to be quadratic, βR = 1, and there are no liquidity constraints.
The PIH-model provides closed-form solutions for the predicted growth in consumption as
a function of innovations to income. Hansen and Sargent (1981) and Hansen, Roberds, and
Sargent (1991) show that if income can be represented by the ARMA process a(L)Yjt = b(L)εjt,













where εjt is the income innovation. See Deaton (1992) for a textbook exposition. For example,





When a>0, consumption should react more than one-to-one to changes in current income. On
the other hand, the predicted MPC out of lagged income is 0 (see Appendix C for more details).
Furthermore, because of certainty equivalence, changes in the volatility of income (keeping the
mean ﬁxed) do not aﬀect the MPCs. This allows us to study the aggregate implications of the
model by analyzing a representative-agent model where the representative consumer receives
aggregate income.
The Buﬀer-Stock Model
The buﬀer-stock model also considers forward-looking rational consumers. However, in this





1−ρ .W i t hρ>0, the agent is risk-averse and has a precautionary
motive for saving.
11In the literature, buﬀer-stock savings behavior has been derived from two diﬀerent assump-
tions. Deaton (1991) explicitly imposes a no-borrowing constraint, Sjt > 0, but assumes agents
always receive positive income. Carroll (1992), on the other hand, endogenously generates a no-
borrowing constraint by assuming individuals may receive zero income (a transitory disastrous
state) with a very small probability. In this case, the agent will optimally never want to borrow
to avoid U (0) = ∞. We follow Deaton’s speciﬁcation in this paper.
A closed-form solution to the model does not exist and it must be solved by computational
methods (see Appendix D). It is well-known that consumption functions for a buﬀer-stock
consumer are nonlinear, so explicit aggregation is needed to obtain implications for aggregate
consumption. In this case, the MPCs depend both on persistence and uncertainty levels. How-
ever, Ludvigson and Michaelides (2001) show that an explicitly aggregated buﬀer-stock model
cannot replicate the excess smoothness and excess sensitivity observed in U.S. aggregate data
and recur to incomplete information to generate some excesses. The assumption that agents
have less information about their own income than econometricians is somewhat controversial
and the amount of smoothness generated by this assumption does not seem large enough to
explain the very signiﬁcant smoothness found in state-level data. Other mechanisms that can
lower the predicted current MPC are habit formation (see Carroll 2000, Michaelides 2001), or the
inclusion of indivisible durables that can only be purchased with non-negligible down payments
(see Luengo-Prado 2006). Both mechanisms deliver an optimal sluggish response of consumption
to changes in permanent income that can generate some excesses. We describe a buﬀer-stock
model with durables and down payments next.
An Augmented Buﬀer-Stock Model with Durables and Down Payments
Our buﬀer-stock model with nondurables, durables and down payment requirements follows
Luengo-Prado (2006). Consumer j derives utility from the consumption of a nondurable good C
and the services provided by a durable good K (for simplicity we assume that durable services










12s.t. Sjt = RSj,t−1 + Yjt − Cjt − (Kjt − ψKj,t−1) − χ(Kjt,K j,t−1),
Sjt ≥− (1 − θ)Kjt,
where ψ is the depreciation factor (one minus the depreciation rate) and χ(Kjt,K j,t−1)i sa n
adjustment cost function equal to 0 if Kj,t = ψKj,t and φψKj,t−1 otherwise. This adjustment
cost can be interpreted as a proportional loss in the selling price of the durable stock attributed
to any type of cost incurred upon sale, such as sales commissions or imperfections in the resale
market for the durable. We assume that the instantaneous utility function is separable in the









An important aspect of the model is the collateralized constraint imposed on the agent,
Sjt ≥− (1−θ)Kjt,w i t hθ ∈ [0,1]. This implies that an individual’s borrowing limit is a fraction
(1 − θ) of the durable stock. The constraint summarizes several commonly observed aspects of
collateral lending. A household can ﬁnance a fraction (1 − θ) of durable purchases but must
provide a fraction θ of the durable’s value as a down payment. On the other hand, a household
owning a durable good can obtain a durable-equity loan with a maximum loan-to-value ratio
(1 − θ). This wealth constraint alters the allocation of resources between the durable and the
nondurable goods and has implications for the volatility of the consumption of the two goods.
Luengo-Prado (2006) shows that in this framework, nondurable consumption becomes smoother
relative to income as down payment requirements increase for two diﬀerent reasons. First, when
income is transitorily low, a buﬀer-stock consumer on occasion liquidates the equity accumu-
lated in the durable to prop up nondurable consumption. Since higher required down payments
translate into higher levels of equity, nondurable consumption becomes smoother. Second, when
an individual experiences a positive permanent income shock, he or she chooses not to fully
adjust consumption due to the desire to spread out the cost of accumulating a down payment.
Thus, the sluggish response of durable and nondurable consumption to changes in permanent
income can generate robust excesses at the aggregate level for reasonable parameter values. In
this model, ceteris paribus, the higher θ relative to the user cost of the durable, R − ψ/R, the
higher the excesses.
11We follow Bernanke (1984) who studies the joint consumption of durable and nondurable goods and ﬁnds





13As for the standard buﬀer-stock model, there is no closed-form solution (see Appendix D for
a brief description of our computational method) and explicit aggregation is needed to obtain
implications for aggregate consumption. The MPCs depend on both persistence and uncertainty
levels in this model also.
Rule-of-Thumb Consumers
In this setting, agents consume their income every period (Cjt = Yjt) and this model does
not generate excess smoothness since ∆Cjt =∆ Yjt. The rule-of-thumb model (ROT) generates
excess sensitivity only if income growth is persistent. As in the PIH case, the aggregate im-
plications of this model can be calculated by assuming that a representative agent receives the
aggregate income process.
Time-Aggregation
We anticipate that neither the PIH model nor the standard buﬀer-stock model generate
robust excess sensitivity at the state-level. In order to generate additional sensitivity, we take into
account that consumers’ decision intervals and data-sampling intervals may be diﬀerent, i.e., we
allow for temporal aggregation. Time-aggregation generates excess sensitivity in a representative
PIH model (see Working 1960). Appendix C spells out the details. Time-aggregation also
delivers additional excess sensitivity in buﬀer-stock models.
Risk Sharing
We ﬁnd that the sensitivity of consumption to current income shocks is much lower than can
be explained by the models considered thus far. A potential explanation could be that inno-
vations to measured disposable income are not a correct measure of the changes in consumers’
actual budget constraints.
The predicted change in consumption in the PIH-framework, see equation (5), is calculated
using two features of the model. The ﬁrst is the celebrated martingale result of Hall (1978) and











where St measures asset holdings at the beginning of period t. An income shock εt gives rise to
a change in the right-hand side of the budget constraint that aﬀects consumption by the factor
shown in equation (5). Consider the situation where risk sharing takes the form of a “transfer”
τt to the representative agent which is not part of measured disposable income paid out of
U.S. aggregate consumption. Such transfers will render equation (6) invalid for the purpose
of determining consumption. We will outline the argument further below—a more detailed
discussion of this issue can be found in Attanasio and Pavoni (2006).
In the real world, payments of dividends, interest, and rent are not ﬁxed interest rate returns
and the stochastic returns potentially provide substantial smoothing of the labor income of U.S.
states. The variable τ will capture such deviations from the model. Stochastic returns could
possibly be measured or imputed but τ also is likely to capture a host of other variables that
“break” the budget constraint based on measured disposable income, such as unmeasured capital
gains, ﬁnancial help from family and friends, misreported income, bankruptcy, etc. While many
potential unmeasured transfers come to mind, it is hard to know their quantitative importance.
However, examining the degree of excess smoothness can help assessing this, as pointed out by
Attanasio and Pavoni (2006). Recall that our empirical work includes time-ﬁxed eﬀects so any
aggregate numbers will not aﬀect our results and, consequently, τt,a sw e l la sεt, should—for the
purpose of this paper—be interpreted as state speciﬁc variables that average to 0.










(Yt+k + τt+k) . (7)
If there is full risk sharing, the variable Yt+k + τt+k will simply be zero (when the variables
are measured as deviations from aggregate variables). However, perfect risk sharing is not the
optimal outcome in a situation where moral hazard makes agents likely to supply less (or no)
eﬀort under full risk sharing. Abraham and Pavoni (2005) develop a model where agents’ eﬀort is
unobserved and agents have access to a bond market with a ﬁxed interest rate but where agents’
asset holdings are unobserved. In such a setting, partial risk sharing will be a constrained
15optimum under certain parametric assumptions. The intuition is that it has to provide positive
utility for agents to provide eﬀort even if part of the fruits from eﬀort will be shared due to
risk sharing. However, as long as agents have access to a bond market the Euler equation for
consumption will hold and, in particular for the quadratic utility case, consumption will be a
martingale if the interest rate equals the subjective time discount rate.12
If the temporal behavior of Y + τ can be described by the ARMA-process α(L)(Yt + τt)=











if utility is quadratic and the interest rate equals the time discount rate. In other words, the
PIH still holds but post-risk sharing income replaces income. In a regression of ∆Ct on current
income of the form:
∆Ct = µt + γ∆Yt + ut, (8)
the right hand side variable can be interpreted as Yt +τt plus a measurement error (−τt). If the
measurement error is uncorrelated with the true regressor, it is well-known downward bias will
occur. If one is willing to make strong parametric and functional form restrictions, one can obtain
a stronger prediction. We, again, refer the reader to Attanasio and Pavoni (2006) for details and
note that they derive a model with moral hazard due to unobserved eﬀort where Yt + τt = ωyt
for a constant ω<1. One can consider 1 − ω the amount of partial risk sharing and the value
of ω can be deduced from the observation that in regression (8), the estimated coeﬃcient γ will
be ω ×   where   is the coeﬃcient one would obtain in the “correct” PIH-regression:
∆Ct = µt +  ∆(ωYt)+ut. (9)
In other words, if there is 50% partial risk sharing the estimated coeﬃcient in a regression of
consumption on measured disposable income will be 50% lower than predicted by a model that
ignores risk sharing. The coeﬃcient to lagged income will similarly be 50% lower. Note, that
ω measures the amount of consumption insurance “starting from” measured disposable labor
12The assumption that asset holdings are unobserved is necessary for this outcome to be optimal. If asset
holdings were observed a planner could control those and the properties of the model would change.
16income. If state-level output is the relevant state-level endowment shock, a lot of risk sharing
can take place between ﬁnancial institutions, ﬁrms, and governments and ω would be a lower
bound for “total” risk sharing. Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) measure state-level overall
inter-state risk sharing but do not attempt to separate the amount of consumption smoothing
taking place through optimal savings behavior (“self-insurance”) from the amount of partial
(unobserved) risk sharing measured by ω.
For the interpretation of our results we make approximations. We assume, as is typical in the
PIH-related literature, that the relations derived for the change in variables approximately hold
for the change in log-transformed variables. Also, we will assume that the considerations in this
section are approximately valid in the setting where the consumer may face credit constraints.
3.3 Calibration and aggregation procedures
Calibration
A good calibration of the income process is essential to obtain qualitative and quantitative
predictions. To calibrate the aggregate and state-level income shocks, we use our estimates of
Section 2.1. As the baseline state-level income shock, we use the simple average across states of
the estimated AR(1) parameters in Table 1. Idiosyncratic income shocks are taken from previous
studies—see, for example, Carroll and Samwick (1997) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002). In
particular, we set σV =0 .07 and σN =0 .05 in the benchmark calibration.
Regarding other parameters, the interest rate is set to 2%. In the buﬀer-stock models risk
aversion is ρ = 2 and the discount rate is 5%, both standard in the literature. For the buﬀer-stock
model with durables, we follow Luengo-Prado (2006) and set the adjustment cost parameter, φ,
equal to 5%, a typical realtor’s commission. ψ, the depreciation factor, is set to 0.915, implying
an annual depreciation rate of 8.5%.13 The down payment parameter θ is 0.3.14
13We obtain this number by combining data from the National Income and Product Accounts and the Fixed
Assets and Consumer Durable Goods Accounts from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the years 1959–2001.
We interpret durables, K, in a comprehensive manner as the sum of residential stocks and all consumer durable
goods. Accordingly, investment in durables, I, is calculated as expenditure on consumer durables plus residential
private domestic investment. We assume the U.S. is in steady state and calculate the real, average ratio of
investment on durables to the durable stock, which determines the depreciation rate: 1 − ψ = I/K.
14According to the Federal Housing Finance Board, the average down payment for a house for the period 1963–
2001 was 25 percent. We choose the slightly higher number because we include durables other than houses in our
17Aggregation procedure
While it is possible to work with a representative-agent model for the PIH and the ROT
model, it is well-known that consumption functions for a buﬀer-stock consumer are nonlinear, so
explicit aggregation is needed to obtain implications for aggregate consumption. Our simulation
exercise is similar in spirit to that of Ludvigson and Michaelides (2001), who calibrate their
income process to match U.S. aggregate income and focus on explaining excess sensitivity and
excess smoothness at the aggregate level. Our goal, however, is to assess how income persistence
and income uncertainty impact the MPCs using state-level data, so we proceed in a diﬀerent
manner.
Ideally, we would like our simulation exercise to be as close as possible to the empirical
strategy in Section 2.2. Brieﬂy, we would like to simulate 50 states with diﬀerent persistence and
uncertainty parameters and a common aggregate productivity shock. Then, we would run panel-
data regressions with both state-ﬁxed eﬀects and time-ﬁxed eﬀects. The inclusion of time-ﬁxed
eﬀects is important because this removes the ﬁrst-order impact of the more persistent aggregate
(U.S.-wide) shock—due to the non-linearity of the model, the results are not, however, identical
to simulating the model without any U.S. wide component. Due to computational limitations,
we simulate “states” with state-speciﬁc shocks generated from a common distribution. In other
words, our simulated states are ex-ante identical but ex-post diﬀerent because they are subject
to diﬀerent shocks.15 We calculate marginal eﬀects on the MPCs of changes in persistence, and
changes in transitory and permanent uncertainty by changing the parameters of our baseline
calibration (for all states) one at a time.
We simulate income paths for 30,000 individuals in 10 states—3,000 per state—for a number
of periods. All individuals share a common aggregate shock each period and individuals living
in the same state share state-speciﬁc shocks. Using the optimal consumption functions and
the simulated income paths, we calculate state-level consumption, and state-level income—Cst,
Yst—as the average of individual consumption and income over all consumers living in “state”
interpretation of K.
15Thus, state-ﬁxed eﬀects are not necessary in the regressions with simulated data but are included for compa-
rability with the regressions using actual data.
18s. Then, we run the following panel regressions:
∆logCst = µs + νt + αc ∆logYst + ust, (10)
∆logCst = µs + νt + αl ∆logYs,t−1 + ust. (11)
µs are state-ﬁxed eﬀects and νt are time-ﬁxed eﬀects that control for aggregate eﬀects. Thus,
ˆ αc is the estimated MPC out of current state-speciﬁc income shocks, and similarly ˆ αl is the
estimated MPC out of lagged state-speciﬁc income shocks—for brevity, we refer to them as the
current/lagged MPCs. We repeat this process 20 times and report, in Table 5, the average
current and lagged MPCs across the 20 independent samples. We report the average of the
estimated standard error (for each parameter) across the 20 samples in parentheses.16
Time-aggregation
In some simulations, we take into account that consumers’ decision intervals and data-
sampling intervals may be diﬀerent and allow for temporal aggregation. In particular, we assume
that while agents make decisions on a bi-annual basis, we only observe annual data. In our re-





st are calculated as the average of individual consumption in state s for the ﬁrst and
second half of the year, respectively, and analogously for income. All relevant parameters are
adjusted to the bi-annual frequency for these simulations. Table 4 compares the benchmark
parameter values at both frequencies. Details on how to adjust the income parameter values are
presented in Appendix E.
3.4 Models’ predictions regarding the MPCs
Table 5 presents results comparing the predicted state-level MPCs for the diﬀerent models in
our benchmark calibration. While for the PIH and the ROT models the MPCs are calculated
analytically, for the buﬀer-stock model the MPCs are calculated through explicit aggregation
16Adding more samples to the simulations does not change the results signiﬁcantly. For example, for the
augmented buﬀer-stock model and 100 samples, the current and lagged MPCs are 0.758 (0.01) and 0.357 (0.033),
respectively. With 20 samples, the numbers are 0.756 (0.01) and 0.358 (0.033), as shown in Table 5.
19via simulations. Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses.17
We ﬁrst focus on the results without time-aggregation or risk sharing. Given that the state-
speciﬁc permanent shock is persistent in our benchmark calibration (as =0 .07), the PIH predicts
a current (state-level) MPC higher than 1, roughly 1.07. The lagged MPC is 0. The ROT model
predicts a current MPC of 1, since in this case the change in consumption is simply the change
in income. In the buﬀer-stock model, agents cannot borrow and even though they have some
assets because of prudence, asset holdings are small due to impatience. Hence, individuals can-
not increase consumption as much as PIH consumers would, when facing a persistent positive
permanent shock, resulting in a lower current MPC and a higher lagged MPC. For our baseline
case, the current and lagged MPCs in the buﬀer-stock model are 1.0 and 0.04 respectively. In
the buﬀer-stock model with durables, the current and lagged MPCs are 0.79 and 0.1, respec-
tively. With a non-trivial down payment (30%), agents choose not to adjust consumption levels
immediately when facing permanent income shocks, preferring to spread out the accumulation of
required wealth holdings. As a result the current MPC is lower than in a standard buﬀer-stock
model and the lagged MPC is higher.
All these numbers are far from their empirical counterparts: the estimated current MPC
is 0.33, while the estimated lagged MPC is 0.17. Allowing for time-aggregation increases the
predicted lagged MPC considerably and decreases the current MPC slightly (except for the ROT
model). For the PIH, the current MPC is 1.04 and the lagged MPC is 0.15. For the buﬀer-stock
model with durables, the current MPC goes down to 0.76, while the lagged MPC becomes 0.36.
One might generate higher smoothness and more sensitivity by increasing the required down
payment signiﬁcantly but down payments of, say, 50% of more do not appear to be common.
Adding 50% risk sharing to this model delivers a current MPC of 0.38 and a lagged MPC of
0.18, much closer to their empirical counterparts. The assumption of partial risk sharing of the
simple form applied here, and by Attanasio and Pavoni (2006), allows us to ﬁt the smoothness
of consumption in any of the models considered—for example, we could assume the PIH model
with time-aggregation and about 70 percent risk sharing. However, allowing for such a large
amount of risk sharing would lead us to predict virtually no excess sensitivity.
17These are the average estimated standard errors of ˆ α
c and ˆ α
l in regressions (10) and (11), respectively, across
the 20 independent samples.
20Both time-aggregation and risk sharing are needed to obtain MPCs close to their empirical
counterparts. Therefore, we focus the reminder of our analysis on models that include these
features. In particular, we concentrate on the PIH and the augmented buﬀer-stock model.
Table 6 presents results regarding the eﬀects of persistence and uncertainty on the MPCs in
these two models.
Decreasing persistence to –0.1 lowers the MPCs out of current and lagged income in the
augmented buﬀer-stock model (from 0.38 to 0.35 and from 0.18 to 0.32 respectively). In the
PIH, the current MPC declines from 0.52 to 0.4, while the lagged MPC increases slightly from
0.07 to 0.08. We can calculate the marginal eﬀect of persistence as the change in the MPC
relative to the benchmark case divided by the change in the persistence parameter. Table 6
shows that the marginal eﬀect of increasing persistence on the current MPC is 0.72 in the PIH-
model, quite large, and 0.15 in the buﬀer-stock model. The marginal eﬀect of persistence on the
lagged MPC is –0.06 in the PIH-model and 0.29 in the buﬀer-stock model.
Next, we examine the marginal eﬀects of uncertainty by changing the standard deviation
of the diﬀerent income shocks one at a time. Contrary to the PIH case, these changes have
large eﬀects on the MPCs in the augmented buﬀer-stock model. We start with the idiosyncratic
shocks by reducing their standard deviations by half (one at a time). Because of less uncertainty,
agents save less, which might be expected to lead to higher current MPCs. However, with less
savings and liquidity constraints, agents cannot increase consumption as much in response to a
persistent positive permanent shock. This eﬀect tends to lower the MPCs out of current income
and oﬀsets the former eﬀect in the case of transitory uncertainty and dominates in the case of
permanent uncertainty (in our simulations, the marginal eﬀect of transitory uncertainty on the
current MPC is 0.06, while the marginal eﬀect of permanent uncertainty is 0.76). Note that the
lagged MPCs are higher because with lower savings agents are liquidity constrained more often.
The marginal eﬀects in Table 6 look quite large: –0.5 for transitory uncertainty and –0.8 for
permanent uncertainty. However, a unit increase in the standard deviation of any of the income
shocks corresponds to quite a massive increase in uncertainty.
Finally, more state-level aggregate uncertainty is introduced by changing the standard devia-
tion of the state-level shocks one at a time.18 More state-level aggregate permanent uncertainty
18We increase the standard deviation in this case. The direction of the changes are chosen such that the model
21results in a higher current MPC in these simulations. Because agents hold more assets due to
higher uncertainty, they can adjust consumption more promptly in response to persistent positive
permanent income shocks, which increases the current MPC. Also, consumers are constrained
less often and the lagged MPC decreases slightly.
The clear ﬁnding that states with more persistent income shocks have higher sensitivity to
income provides strong support to forward-looking models such as the PIH and precautionary
savings models. Instrumental in bringing the predicted smoothness to the level observed is the
combination of credit constraints and durable goods together with partial risk sharing. Time-
aggregation will then explain the observed sensitivity to lagged income while 50% risk sharing is
not so large as to drive the predicted sensitivity to zero. The impatience that creates buﬀer-stock
behavior is necessary to explain why states where agents are likely to face signiﬁcant individual
level uncertainty display less sensitivity.
A model that roughly ﬁts the behavior of U.S. state-level consumption (when adjusted for
aggregate components) is a model with time-aggregation and 50% partial risk sharing where
half the population behaves like PIH-consumers while the other half faces credit constraints,
is impatient, and demands lumpy durable goods. The predicted MPCs and marginal impacts
of our regressors are displayed in the right-most third of Table 6. The predicted current MPC
is at the high end of a 95% conﬁdence interval for the estimated current MPC in Table 3 and
the marginal eﬀect on the current MPC of persistence is somewhat lower (by one standard
deviation) than the coeﬃcient to the persistence interaction found in Table 3. Nonetheless, the
overall impression is that this model does an impressive job of matching the features of the data.
4 Conclusions
Using panel-data regressions, we document that state-level consumption displays strong excess
smoothness and sensitivity. Also, the persistence of state-level income aﬀects the current mar-
ginal propensity to consume signiﬁcantly, with states with higher persistence exhibiting higher
MPCs. Further, we observe that excess sensitivity is higher in states where consumers are likely
to face higher income uncertainty.
satisﬁes the convergence condition of footnote 21.
22We show that a combination of models is required to simultaneously explain these features.
While the eﬀect of income persistence on the current MPC is consistent with a standard forward-
looking model such as the PIH, this setup alone cannot account for the magnitude of excess
smoothness and sensitivity observed in state-level data, nor the dependency of the MPCs on
uncertainty indicators. A simple explanation of excess sensitivity may be that consumers make
decisions at a higher frequency than the data available to econometricians. Excess smoothness
can be explained by the fact that innovations to measured disposable income may not be the right
measure of changes in a consumer’s actual budget constraint in the presence of unobserved risk
sharing. Further, buﬀer-stock behavior is consistent with the observed higher excess sensitivity
in agricultural states. A suitably calibrated model that combines these features can ﬁt the data
fairly well.
Our work in this article put together a model in order to ﬁt the data. In order to actually
test this model, one would need to estimate it on independent data from, say, another country.
Such testing would be an interesting topic for future work.
Appendices
A The Data
We use state-level annual data from a variety of sources. We construct state-level disposable
labor income for the period 1964–1998 using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
We deﬁne labor income as personal income minus dividends, interest, and rent, and social
security contributions. We calculate after-tax labor income by multiplying labor income by
one minus the tax rate, where we approximate the tax rate by total personal taxes divided by
personal income for each state in each year. We refer to the resulting series as disposable labor
income or—for brevity—just as labor income or income. The panel regressions in Section 2.2
use a shorter sample, 1970–1998, due to lack of availability of other variables prior to 1970.
However, in order to obtain more precise parameter estimates we use the larger sample in the
income estimations of Section 2.1. We also, for robustness, used the BEA disposable personal
income data by state and found qualitatively similar results.
23We perform state-by-state Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for unit roots in labor
income. These tests reject the unit root null hypothesis for only a few states at conventional
levels of signiﬁcance. ADF tests provide somewhat weak evidence because they have low power
for samples as short as ours. The overall impression is, nevertheless, that U.S. state-level labor
income is well-described as an integrated process.19 We, therefore, treat labor income growth
as a stationary series.
We approximate state-level consumption by state-level retail sales published in the Survey
of Buying power, in Sales Management (after 1976, Sales and Marketing Management). Retail
sales are a somewhat noisy proxy for state-level private consumption but no better data seems to
exist. The retail sales data is available from 1963–1998. The correlation between annual growth
rates of aggregate U.S. total (nondurable) retail sales and aggregate U.S. total (nondurable and
services) private consumption from the National Income and Product Account, both measured
in real terms and per capita, is 0.84 (0.65). We transform the retail sales and labor income series
to per capita terms using population data from the BEA and deﬂate them using the Consumer
Price Index from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS).
B Estimation of Standard Errors
Because the parameters for the state-level income processes are estimated in an initial regression
they are random variables. This “generated regressors” problem leads to bias in the standard
errors reported by OLS. We, therefore, use a “parametric bootstrap” procedure to calculate
standard errors for all the coeﬃcients.
Our approach is as follows. We regress consumption growth on the non-generated regressors
Xst (including ﬁxed eﬀects) and the estimated regressors Ys (which do not vary over time) using
OLS (after weighting the variables with state- and time-speciﬁc estimated standard errors):
cst = Xstγ + Ysδ + es ,
where s =1 ,...,50 is an index of the states, t =1 ,...,T is an index of time, and γ and δ
19Ostergaard, Sørensen, and Yosha (2002) show that panel unit root tests for disposable income—when aggre-
gate income is subtracted—provide little evidence against the unit root hypothesis. Disposable income is highly
correlated with labor income state-by-state and the results using labor income are similar.
24are OLS-coeﬃcients. From this regression, we retrieve the estimated values ˆ γ and ˆ δ and the
estimated standard error se of the residuals es. We proceed to estimating the standard errors of
ˆ γ and ˆ δ from the following Monte Carlo experiment. In each iteration l we draw from an i.i.d.
N(0,s e) distribution a vector of variables, e
(l)




st = Xstˆ γ + Ysˆ δ + e
(l)
st .
Then, for each state s and time period t, we generate Y
(l)
s by drawing from an N(Ys,ΣYs)
distribution where ΣYsis the variance matrix with the estimated standard errors of Ys reported
in Table 1 in the diagonal (for example, 0.017 for persistence in Alabama).
We then perform a panel-data regression of c
(l)
st on Xst and Y
(l)
s and record the estimated
coeﬃcients ˆ γ(l) and ˆ δ(l). We repeat this for l =1 ,...,25000 and then calculate the standard
errors of ˆ γ(l) and ˆ δ(l). These are the standard errors reported in the tables.
C The MPC in the PIH Case
This appendix describes how to calculate the approximate current and lagged MPCs for the
PIH-model. First, we show how consumption reacts to income innovations and then we discuss
time-aggregation issues.
Consumption Growth and Innovations to Income
Given our assumptions about the income process, state-speciﬁc income growth is ∆(logYst−
logYt)=l o g Gst. For notational simpliﬁcation, let gt =l o g Gst and logYst − logYt = yt.B y
assumption, gt = asgt−1 + εt. We drop the superscript in s hereafter. Thus, ∆yt = gt =
a∆yt−1 + εt.
Because the PIH is formulated in levels rather than logs, we must assume the process for
the ﬁrst diﬀerence of state-speciﬁc income can be approximately described by the process for
the log diﬀerence: ∆(logYst − logYt)   ∆(Yst − Yt). Hansen and Sargent (1981) and Deaton
(1992) show that if income can be represented by the ARMA process a(L)yt = b(L)εt, the PIH
predicts that: ∆Ct = R−1









25The ARMA representation for our state-speciﬁc income process is (1 − aL)(1 − L)yt = εt.




εt = Hεt. (12)
H equals 1 when a = 0 and increases with persistence. We can calculate the MPC out of




var(∆yt−1) respectively. In this
case, var(∆yt)=σ2
ε/(1 − a2), cov(∆Ct,∆yt)=Hσ2
ε, cov(∆Ct,∆yt−1) = 0. Thus, the current
MPC is equal to H × (1 − a2) and the lagged MPC is 0.
Time-Aggregation
We assume that agents make consumption decisions bi-annually but we only observe data
at annual frequencies (i.e., we observe Ct = C1
t + C2
t , where Ci
t is consumption in the ith half
of year t, i =1 ,2).
Using equation (12)—valid for the relevant frequency in the agent’s optimization problem—

















where the last part follows from recursive backward substitution. Thus, the annual consumption









Regarding income, we assume that the the bi-annual income processes are AR(1), so ∆y2
t =
a∆y1
t +  2
t and ∆y1
t = a∆y2
t−1 +  1
t. Annual income is then yt = y2
t + y1















using recursive backwards substitution, we obtain:
∆yt =∆ y2













= a2∆yt−1 +[ ε2
t +( 2+a)ε1
t +( 1+2 a)ε2
t−1 + aε1
t−1].













For a = 0, the MPC out of current income is 1 and the MPC out of lagged income is
1/6. Therefore, time-aggregation produces robust excess sensitivity in the PIH model (see
Working 1960).
Furthermore, both cov(∆Ct,∆yt)a n dvar(∆yt) increase with a. For small values of a, the
covariance increases faster and the current MPC increases in a initially, but could eventually
decrease.
D Solution Methods for the Buﬀer-Stock Models
The standard buﬀer-stock model
A closed-form solution of the model does not exist and it must be solved by computational
methods. Following Deaton (1991), the model is ﬁrst reformulated in terms of cash-on-hand,
Xjt ≡ RSjt−1 + Yjt.20 Given the homogeneity property of the utility function, all variables
can be normalized by permanent income to deal with non-stationarity, as proposed by Carroll
(1997). The ﬁrst order condition of the problem becomes:
U (cjt)=m a x {U (xjt),βREt[(At+1Gs,t+1Nj,t+1)−ρU (cj,t+1)]}, (15)
where cjt = Cjt/Pjt and xj,t+1 =( At+1Gs,t+1Nj,t+1)−1R(xjt − cjt)+Vj,t+1.21 Individuals dis-
tinguish aggregate from state-speciﬁc shocks and optimize accordingly. We use Euler equation
20The budget constraint becomes Sjt = Xjt − Cjt and the liquidity constraint Cjt ≤ Xjt. Combining the
deﬁnition of cash-on-hand and the budget constraint, we can write an expression for the evolution of cash-on-
hand: Xjt+1 = R(Xjt − Cjt)+Yj,t+1.
21A necessary condition for the individual Euler equation to deﬁne a contraction mapping is
βREt[(At+1Gs,t+1Nj,t+1)
−ρ] < 1. This is the “impatience” condition common to buﬀer-stock models which
guarantees that borrowing is part of the unconstrained plan.
27iteration to solve Equation (15) numerically. x is discretized and the income shocks are ap-
proximated by discrete Markov processes following Tauchen (1986). We use 5 points for N,
V , A and G. Interpolation is used between points in the x grid. The numerical technique de-
livers a consumption function c(x,A,G): normalized consumption as a function of normalized
cash-on-hand and the aggregate and state-speciﬁc permanent states. In other words, our opti-
mal policy function for consumption has 25 branches, one for each (A,G) combination of the
discrete approximations of the persistent permanent income shocks.22
The augmented buﬀer-stock model
In this case the problem is solved using a ﬁnite state approximation method. The technique
consists of specifying a ﬁnite-state problem that approximates the continuous one we want
to solve. As with the previous technique, all relevant variables are normalized by permanent
income (lower case notation). Also, the problem is reformulated in terms of a variable that
we call voluntary equity, qjt ≡ sjt +( 1− θ)kjt, the equity held in excess of the required down
payment. Unlike sjt with a lower limit which depends on the value of the durable, voluntary
equity has lower limit of 0 (independent of the value of the durable), which greatly simpliﬁes
computation. From the equation for the evolution of assets, we can work out an equation for
the evolution of normalized voluntary equity: qjt =( AtGstNjt)−1{Rqj,t−1 +[ ψ(1 − dφ) − R(1 −
θ)]kj,t−1}−θkj,t + vjt − cjt, where d is 1 if the household changes the durable stock and 0
otherwise. Next, using the homogeneity of degree (1 − ρ) of the utility function, we can write
the Bellman equation of the problem as:










Rqj,t−1 +[ ψ(1 − dφ) − R(1 − θ)]kj,t−1

−θkjt + Vjt − qjt,k jt

+ βV(qjt,k jt,A t+1,G s,t+1)

. (16)
We replace the continuous state variables, k and q, with the ﬁnite sets, K = {k1,...,k Nk} and
Q = {q1,...,q Nq}. Note that the problem has been conveniently formulated in such a way
22More details on how to solve this equation can be found, for example, in the appendix of Ludvigson and
Michaelides (2001).
28that the control variables are next period’s states. The liquidity constraint is implemented by
setting q1 = 0 and qi > 0,∀qi ∈Q ,i>1. To deal with adjustment cost, we set: d =0 ,
if |kjt − (AtGstNjt)−1ψkj,t−1|≤κ, and d =1 ,i f|kjt − (AtGstNjt)−1ψkj,t−1| >κ , where κ =
(kn − kl)/(Nk − 1). The precision of our solution increases as κ falls.
As with the previous technique, all components of the income process are discretized, using
5 points for each income shock. We use 300 points for the q and k grids. While the lower bounds
for the grids are set at 0, the upper bounds are determined by trial and error. We use value
function iteration, which is sped up with an acceleration technique, modiﬁed policy function
iteration with S states as described in Judd (1997) to solve the discretized problem. We refer
the interested reader to Luengo-Prado (2006) for more details.
E Time-Aggregation and Income Growth
In this appendix, we discuss how the calibration of income needs to be adjusted when going
from annual to the bi-annual frequencies. For simplicity of exposition, we ﬁrst show how to deal
with permanent shocks and then we consider transitory shocks.
Permanent shocks
Let us assume that there are no transitory shocks to income and there is only one permanent
shock for simplicity. In particular, income in the second half of period t equals permanent income,
Y 2
t = P2
t . Permanent income in turn is P2
t = G2
tP1
t ,w i t hl o gG1
t = alogG2
t + ε2
t.L e tl o g G ≡ g,
and logY ≡ y. Thus, bi-annual income growth is an AR(1) process: ∆y2
t = a∆y1
t + ε2
t.L e tu s
work out which this implies for annual income growth.
Annual income in t is deﬁned as the sum of income in both halves of year t:
Yt = Y 1













29where the third line follows from recursive backward substitution. Annual income in t − 1i s :
Yt−1 = Y 1




Then, income growth in period t is:
∆logYt ≡ ∆yt = g2
t−1 + g1
t + log(1 + eg2























where the second part follows from a ﬁrst order Taylor series approximation. Using recursive











































= a2∆yt−1 + wt.
Because E[wtwt−k]=0f o rk>1, ∆yt follows an ARMA(1,1) process. Note that if persistence
is a at the bi-annual level, persistence becomes a2 at the annual level. Also, σ2
w =0 .5(3 + 4a +
3a2)σ2
ε. In our simulations, we abstract from the MA component at the annual frequency. We
assume that income growth is an AR(1) both at the bi-annual and at the annual frequencies. In
other words, if bi-annual income growth is an AR(1) process with persistence a and variance σ2
ε,
annual income growth is approximated by an AR(1) process with persistence a2 and variance
σ2
w. For example, an annual persistence of 0.07—the average persistence for idiosyncratic state-
level income—corresponds to a bi-annual persistence of 0.265. For that level of persistence, an






Let us now assume that there are only transitory shocks to income. Income in the second half
of period t is: Y 2
t = V 2




v), where −log(2) guarantees that
the transitory shock at the annual frequency still has mean 1. Income growth at the bi-annual
frequency is simply ∆y2
t = v2
t − v1
t. At the annual frequency, Yt = Y 2





















where the second part follows from a ﬁrst order Taylor approximation. Without time-aggregation
and an annual calibration, ∆yt = ut −ut−1 (where ut is the log of the annual transitory shock).
To obtain the same income growth volatility, we need to set σ2
v =2 σ2
u. For example, for a
standard deviation of the transitory shock at the annual level of 0.07, we should use a standard
deviation of approximately 0.1 at the bi-annual level.
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33Table 1: Parameters of Time Series Process for State-Level Disposable Labor Income.
(1) (2)
Persistence σGs
Alabama 0.16 (0.17) 0.74 (0.09)
Alaska 0.37 (0.16) 4.57 (0.54)
Arizona 0.35 (0.17) 1.31 (0.15)
Arkansas –0.14 (0.17) 1.70 (0.20)
California 0.17 (0.19) 1.17 (0.14)
Colorado 0.41 (0.15) 1.26 (0.15)
Connecticut 0.39 (0.16) 1.56 (0.18)
Delaware –0.04 (0.17) 1.46 (0.17)
Florida 0.09 (0.17) 1.24 (0.15)
Georgia 0.33 (0.16) 0.83 (0.10)
Hawaii 0.20 (0.16) 2.65 (0.31)
Idaho –0.53 (0.15) 2.49 (0.29)
Illinois 0.07 (0.16) 0.92 (0.11)
Indiana –0.06 (0.17) 1.51 (0.18)
Iowa –0.38 (0.15) 3.28 (0.39)
Kansas –0.12 (0.16) 1.25 (0.15)
Kentucky –0.24 (0.15) 1.21 (0.14)
Louisiana 0.50 (0.14) 1.73 (0.20)
Maine –0.16 (0.16) 1.61 (0.19)
Maryland 0.20 (0.17) 1.38 (0.16)
Massachusetts 0.45 (0.15) 1.48 (0.17)
Michigan 0.07 (0.16) 1.78 (0.21)
Minnesota –0.28 (0.15) 1.78 (0.21)
Mississippi 0.02 (0.17) 1.55 (0.18)
Missouri –0.25 (0.16) 1.22 (0.14)
Montana –0.23 (0.16) 2.78 (0.33)
Nebraska –0.49 (0.14) 2.74 (0.32)
Nevada 0.40 (0.15) 1.58 (0.19)
New Hampshire 0.29 (0.16) 2.00 (0.24)
New Jersey 0.18 (0.18) 1.40 (0.17)
New Mexico 0.08 (0.17) 1.37 (0.16)
New York 0.10 (0.17) 1.55 (0.18)
North Carolina –0.06 (0.17) 1.04 (0.12)
North Dakota –0.18 (0.16) 9.28 (1.09)
Ohio –0.28 (0.16) 1.07 (0.13)
Oklahoma 0.26 (0.16) 1.58 (0.19)
Oregon 0.05 (0.17) 1.51 (0.18)
Pennsylvania 0.07 (0.17) 0.94 (0.11)
Rhode Island 0.15 (0.16) 1.83 (0.22)
South Carolina 0.15 (0.16) 1.10 (0.13)
South Dakota –0.30 (0.15) 5.17 (0.61)
Tennessee –0.01 (0.16) 0.97 (0.11)
Texas 0.48 (0.15) 1.28 (0.15)
Utah 0.35 (0.16) 1.20 (0.14)
Vermont 0.03 (0.16) 1.50 (0.18)
Virginia 0.14 (0.16) 1.14 (0.13)
Washington 0.40 (0.15) 1.45 (0.17)
West Virginia 0.15 (0.16) 1.52 (0.18)
Wisconsin –0.08 (0.16) 1.01 (0.12)
Wyoming 0.32 (0.15) 2.62 (0.31)
Notes: The table displays the estimated parameters of a time series model for real disposable labor income. Let yst be the
log of per capita disposable labor income (deﬂated by the CPI) in state i. The model is: yst = µs +l o gGst,w h e r eµs is a
constant for each state, and logGst = a
s logGst−1 + σGs  st where  st are i.i.d. normal innovations. a
s is persistence and
σGs is the standard deviation of the permanent component. The table reports the estimates of a
s in column (1) and 100
times σGs in column (2). Standard errors in parentheses. Sample 1964–1998.Table 2: Correlation Matrices of Regressand and Regressors
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(0) ct 1.00 0.12 –0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 –0.01 0.07
(1) yt 1.00 0.03 0.06 –0.46 0.72 0.60 0.41
(2) Farm Share 1.00 –0.25 –0.03 0.02 0.06 –0.06
(3) Gov’t. Share 1.00 0.02 0.04 –0.01 0.15
(4) Persistence×yt 1.00 –0.50 –0.76 0.19
(5) ˆ σGs×yt 1.00 0.87 0.42
(6) (Farm Share)×yt 1.00 0.08
(7) (Gov’t. Share)×yt 1.00
(0) ct 1.00 0.05 –0.06 0.02 0.07 –0.02 –0.08 0.11
(1) yt−1 1.00 0.03 0.03 –0.45 0.71 0.60 0.40
(2) Farm Share 1.00 –0.25 –0.04 0.04 0.07 –0.06
(3) Gov’t. Share 1.00 –0.02 0.04 0.02 0.07
(4) Persistence×yt−1 1.00 –0.50 –0.76 0.19
(5) ˆ σGs×yt−1 1.00 0.87 0.42
(6) (Farm Share)×yt−1 1.00 0.08
(7) (Gov’t. Share)×yt−1 1.00
Notes: The table shows how the variables entering the regressions correlate across the 50 U.S. states over the years
1970–1998. ct is state s’s nondurable consumption growth (real and per capita) in period t after subtracting state- and
time-speciﬁc means. yt is real per capita disposable labor income growth minus the state- and time-speciﬁc means. “Farm
Share” is the ratio of employees (including proprietors) in farming to the total number of employees in each state in period
t in the top part of the panel, and for period t − 1 in the bottom part of the panel, with the average for each time period
and for each state subtracted. “Gov’t. Share” is deﬁned similarly. “Persistence” refers, for each state, to the number in
the column (1) in Table 1 minus its mean. Row (4) corresponds to that number interacted with income with time- and
state-speciﬁc means subtracted. For row (5) the standard deviations from Table 1 are treated similarly. Farm-share in
row (6) is the farm share as just deﬁned minus its time-speciﬁc mean; this is then multiplied by income with time- and
state-speciﬁc means subtracted. Gov’t. share in row (7) is treated similarly.
35Table 3: Sensitivity to Current and Lagged Income: Non-Durable Retail Sales
1970-1998
Current MPC Lagged MPC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
yst 0.336∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ ---
(0.049) (0.047) (0.047) - - -
ys,t−1 - - - 0.163∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
- - - (0.046) (0.045) (0.042)
Farm Share –0.001 - - –0.001 - -
(0.001) - - (0.001) - -
Gov’t. Share 0.000 - - 0.000 - -
(0.001) - - (0.001) - -
Interaction terms:
Persistence 0.608∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ –0.089 –0.087 -
(0.175) (0.173) (0.136) (0.157) (0.155) -
ˆ σGs –0.024 –0.024 –0.026∗ 0.005 0.004 -
(0.023) (0.022) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) -
Farm share 0.003 0.001 - –0.037∗∗∗ –0.037∗∗∗ –0.032∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) - (0.012) (0.012) (0.006)
Gov’t. share –0.008 –0.005 - 0.029∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) - (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Notes: Model: cst = µs + vt + αys,t−l + ζ(Xst − ¯ X.t)(ys,t−l − ¯ y.t−l − ¯ ys. +¯ y..)+ust,w h e r el is 0 for current
and 1 for lagged income. yst is state s’s labor income growth (real and per capita). cst is state s’s nondurable
consumption growth (real and per capita). µs is a cross-sectional ﬁxed eﬀect and vt is a time-ﬁxed eﬀect. X is
one of the variables that may aﬀect the MPC, listed as “interaction terms”—see Table 2 for precise deﬁnitions.
Feasible GLS-estimation allowing for the innovation error variance to diﬀer by year and by state. Standard errors
in parentheses. The standard errors for columns (1)-(3), which include generated regressors, are estimated using
parametric Monte Carlo simulation as described in Appendix B. Sample 1970–1998. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗,a n d∗ indicate
signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
36Table 4: Benchmark Parameters for Model Simulations
Parameter Annual Frequency Bi-annual frequency
Aggregate growth, µA 0.016 0.008
Aggregate shock persistence, aA 0.420 0.648
Aggregate shock volatility, σA 0.020 0.011
State-level shock persistence, as 0.070 0.265
State-level shock volatility, σGs 0.018 0.012
Permanent idiosinc. shock volatility, σN 0.050 0.041
Transitory idiosinc. shock volatility, σV 0.070 0.099
Interest rate, R − 1 0.020 0.010
Discount rate, 1/β − 1 0.050 0.025
Depreciation rate, ψ − 1 0.085 0.043
Adjustment cost parameter, φ 0.050 0.050
Down payment, θ 0.300 0.300
Notes: The aggregate and state-level income shocks are calibrated according to the income process
estimation of Section 2.1. The other parameters, including the idiosyncratic income shocks, are taken
from previous studies—see the main text for more particulars. Details on how to adjust the income
parameter values to the bi-annual frequency are described in Appendix E.
37Table 5: Sensitivity to Current and Lagged Income in Simulated Data
No time-aggregation Time-aggregation
PIH ROT Buﬀer Buﬀer-Durable PIH ROT Buﬀer Buﬀer-Durable
No Risk Sharing
Current 1.068 1.000 1.000 0.790 1.042 1.000 0.983 0.756
MPC (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Lagged 0.000 0.070 0.041 0.096 0.148 0.070 0.192 0.358
MPC (0.048) (0.038) (0.046) (0.033)
50% Risk Sharing
Current 0.534 0.500 0.500 0.395 0.521 0.500 0.491 0.378
MPC (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Lagged 0.000 0.035 0.028 0.048 0.074 0.035 0.096 0.179
MPC (0.024) (0.019) (0.023) (0.017)
Notes: The rows labeled “current” report the estimated value of the parameter α
c from the regression:
∆logCst = µs + vt + α
c∆logYst + ust,w h e r eCst and Yst are state nondurable consumption and income
respectively. The columns labeled “lagged” report the estimated value of the parameter α
l for lagged income
from the regression ∆logCst = µs+vt+α
l∆logYs,t−1+ust. For the columns “buﬀer” and “buﬀer-durable,”
consumption is simulated as described in the text. The simulated data is based on the individual-level income
process ∆logYjt =l o g At +l o gGst +l o gNjt +l o gVjt − logVj,t−1,w h e r el o g At and logGst are AR(1)
processes with persistence a
A and a
s respectively, unconditional means µA and 0, and standard deviation
σA and σGs.l o g Njt and logVjt are independent and identically distributed with standard deviations σN and




V /2 respectively. Baseline parameters described in Table 4. “State”-
level consumption and income (Cst, Yst) are averages over 3,000 individuals in each “state.” There are
10 “states” and 50 periods. We report average MPCs for 20 independent simulations. Average estimated
standard errors in parentheses. For the columns labeled “PIH” the numbers are calculated for a log-linear
approximation of a representative-agent PIH-model, with the interest rate equal to the discount rate and the
representative agent receiving the aggregate income process. In the case with time-aggregation, agents are
assumed to make decisions bi-annually but the data is transformed to the annual frequency before running
the regressions. All parameters, including income parameters, are adjusted to a bi-annual frequency in this
case.
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